



# Cheshire and Merseyside Health and Care Partnership

# Integrated Care Systems (ICS)

# Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)

# **Workstream: Unified Direct Care**

Document Reference: ICSIGDOC-ID00008 Date agreed: 21<sup>st</sup> June 2022 Next review date: July 2023





Date DPIA started:	May 2022
Date updated:	N/A
Next review date due by:	This Data Sharing Agreement will be routinely reviewed annually in July by the ICS Information Governance Strategy Committee.
By Whom:	
DPO approved:	
IT Security approved:	C&M HCP Cyber Core Group
Committee approved:	Cheshire and Merseyside ICS Information Governance Strategy Committee
Submitted to ICO Y/N:	No



Health & Care Partnership for Cheshire & Merseyside



Information Reader Box	
Document Purpose:	Ensure consistent application of DPIA process in workstreams
Document Name:	Data Protection Impact Assessment
	Unified Direct Care
Authors:	
Document Origin:	NECS Standard Operating Procedure - Information Governance: <i>Data Protection Impact Assessments</i> (Privacy by Design) (2018)
Target Audience:	All Cheshire and Merseyside Health and Care providers and commissioners as described in the Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement
Description	Data Protection Impact Assessment for Unified Direct Care
Cross Reference:	DPIAs are applicable to Tier Zero, Tier One, and Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement
Superseded Document:	N/A
Action Required:	To note as appropriate for your organisation
Contact Details (for further information and feedback)	The Digital PMO for the ICS, who will direct the enquiry as appropriate
Document Status	
	managed by the ICS. Whilst this document may be printed, this

document should not be saved onto local or other network drives.



Health & Care Partnership for Cheshire & Merseyside



# Contents

Introduction	5
Overview of why we need a Data Protection Impact Assessment	5
Roles and Responsibilities	6
Associated Documents	6
Data Protection Impact Assessment	8
Project title: Integrated Care Systems (ICS)	9
Step 1: Identify the need for a DPIA	9
Step 2: Describe the processing	9
Step 3: Consultation process	13
Step 4: Assess necessity and proportionality	16
Step 5: Identify and assess risks	19
Step 6: Identify measures to reduce risk	23
Step 7: Sign off and record outcomes	
Appendix A: Data Sets	37





### Introduction

Cheshire and Merseyside Shared Care Record is a collaborative programme between the data controllers within Cheshire and Merseyside to deliver the electronic sharing of health and care information for the purposes of direct care and informing population health management for the region. Due to our digital maturity the Cheshire and Merseyside Shared Record has the technical capability to share health and care information outside of regional platform for the purpose of Direct Care. This enabling the information of those who receive care within the Cheshire and Merseyside region to have access to their information at the point of need.

This DPIA covers the flow of data from data controllers into the three shared care records solutions currently in place across the ICS for the purposes of direct care. This ensuring that information is available to the right people, in the right place, at the right time to deliver direct care across integrated care systems as part of a shared care record.

- Care Centric Provided by Graphnet and hosted in Azure and managed by St Helens and Knowsley Hospital Trust
- E-Xchange Provided by Phillips and hosted in Azure and managed by Informatics Merseyside
- Wirral Health Information Exchange provided by Cerner and managed by Wirral University Teaching Hospital

The platform provided by these three systems allow secure cross boundary access to person indexed records for the purposes of direct care. They will support a shared care record that gives providers of health and care access to the information, which is necessary, proportionate, and relevant to their role. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is in place.

Note: This DPIA and associated data sharing documents will be updated if any of the following changes in terms of the data sharing arrangements across C&M ICS:-

- The purpose for data sharing changes
- New data controllers are added
- New data processors are added
- The inclusion of new data flows

### **Overview of why we need a Data Protection Impact Assessment**

Article 35(1) of the General Data Protection Regulations says that you must do a DPIA where a type of processing is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals.

A Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) is a process which can help an organisation identify the most effective way to comply with its data protection obligations. In addition, DPIAs will allow organisations to meet individuals' expectations of privacy.

An effective DPIA will facilitate the identification and minimisation of potential data protection risks at an early stage, reducing the associated costs and damage to reputation which might otherwise occur.

In February 2014, the Information Commissioner issued a code of practice under Section 51 of the Data Protection Act (DPA) in pursuance of the duty to promote good practice. The DPA





says good practice includes, but is not limited to, compliance with the requirements of the Act and undertaking a DPIA ensures that a new project is compliant.

One of the requirements of the UK GDPR is an obligation to conduct a DPIA before carrying out types of processing likely to result in high risk to individual's interests.

## **Roles and Responsibilities**

**Executive Sponsor**: The owner of any data protection risks identified within the DPIA. This person is an appropriately senior manager, ideally a member of the Executive Team, assigned to the relevant Directorate.

**Data controller**: exercises control over the processing and carries data protection responsibility. Their activities will include significant decision making.

Here, the **Data Controllers** are the GP Practices, NHS Providers and Local Authorities, from where the data is sourced and who are listed in **Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement.** 

**Data processor**: simply processes data on behalf of a data controller and their activities are more limited to 'technical' aspects.

Here, the **Data Processors** are Graphnet (Care Centric); Informatics Merseyside; Phillips (e-Xchange); Maywoods (e-Xchange Audit functionality), Cerner (Wirral Health Information Exchange).

**Sub processor**: Under UK GDPR, the controller must give its prior written authorisation when its processor intends to entrust all or part of the tasks assigned to it to a sub processor. The Process remains fully liable to the controller for the performance of the sub-processor's obligations.

### **Associated Documents**

This DPIA is part of the **Data Sharing Agreement Tiered Framework** and should be read in conjunction with the three associated Tier documents:

- Tier Zero Memorandum of Understanding
- Tier One Data Sharing Agreement Standards
- Tier Two Data Sharing Agreement Unified Direct Care

In particular, for this DPIA, please see **Tier Two - Data Sharing Agreement: Unified Direct Care.** This includes details of the following:

#### Parties to the Tier Two Data Sharing Agreement:

- Providing Organisations
- Receiving Organisations





 Data Processors; Graphnet (Care Centric); Informatics Merseyside; Phillips (e-Xchange); Maywoods (e-Xchange Audit functionality); Cerner (Wirral Health Information Exchange)

#### Data Details:

- Purpose of Data Sharing
- Data to be Shared
- Lawful Basis for Sharing Data
- Personnel to have access to the data
- Details of how the Data will be shared Data Flow
- Details of retention and destruction

## For Personal and Sensitive Data

- Sensitive data exclusions
- Data Controller Arrangements
- Receiving Organisations ICO Registration Reference Numbers



Health & Care Partnership for Cheshire & Merseyside



### Data Protection Impact Assessment

Workstream:	Direct Care
Version:	FINAL v1.0
Reference No:	ICSIGDOC-ID00008
Sharing Initiative Name:	Unified Direct Care
Sharing Start Date:	01/07/2022
Lead Organisation(s):	St Helens and Knowsley Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust on behalf of Cheshire and Merseyside Health and Care Partnership
Workstream	Name
Lead	Designation
	Email
	Date 21/06/22
DPO Review	Name
	Designation
	Email
	Date 21/06/22
Designated	Name and a second
Officer Approval	Designation
	Email
	Date of 21/06/22
	review





## DPIA

Project title: Integrated Care Systems (ICS) Tier Two: Unified Direct Care

#### Step 1: Identify the need for a DPIA

**Explain broadly what project aims to achieve and what type of processing it involves.** You may find it helpful to refer or link to other documents, such as a project proposal. Summarise why you identified the need for a DPIA.

The overarching purpose for data sharing is for direct care as part of a shared care record across the Integrated Care System of Cheshire and Merseyside

#### **Other Associated Documents**

This DPIA is part of the **Data Sharing Agreement Tiered Framework** and should be read in conjunction with the three associated Tier documents:

- Tier Zero Memorandum of Understanding
- Tier One Data Sharing Agreement Standards
- Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement

#### **Step 2: Describe the processing**

**Describe the nature of the processing:** how will you collect, use, store and delete data? What is the source of the data? Will you be sharing data with anyone? You might find it useful to refer to a flow diagram or other way of describing data flows. What types of processing identified as likely high risk are involved?

### Please see Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement

#### Parties to the Agreement:

- Providing Organisations
- Receiving Organisations
- Data Processors; Graphnet, (Care Centric); Informatics Merseyside; Phillips (e-Xchange); Maywoods (e-Xchange Audit functionality), Cerner (Wirral Health Information Exchange)

#### Data Details:

- Personnel to have access to the data
- Details of how the Data will be shared Data Flow
- Details of retention and destruction





#### For Personal and Sensitive Data

- Data Controller Arrangements
- Receiving Organisations ICO Registration Reference Numbers

#### **Information Flow Functional Description**

Data in Appendix A will flow in identifiable form to data processors listed above in Parties to Agreement. Data is then shared in the platforms hosted by those data processors and accessed appropriately by those with a legitimate direct care relationship. Role based Access Controls are in place.

#### **Deletion and Redaction of information**

Information can only be deleted by the source organisation.

#### **Risks/actions identified**

The risks and mitigations are shown in the table below in 'Step 5' in respect of collection, storage and deletion and redactions of data that is processed by the Parties listed in this agreement

# Destination of information. Persistent or temporary (if persistent, detail the storage location following transfer)

#### **Care Centric (Graphnet)**

The information persists in the Graphnet CareCentric secure environment in the Azure cloud and is hosted by St Helens and Knowsley Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust. It is accessed by the data controllers listed in this PIA and in the **Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement.** Storage location: Microsoft Azure UK South (Primary Storage Location); Microsoft Azure UK West (Back up Storge location) Organisation Address; Microsoft UK Head Quarters, Microsoft Thames Valley Park. Reading, RG61WB

#### Wirral Health Information Exchange (Cerner)

Exchanges data from systems directly form the source EPRs and does not store data persistently. Data is held in the Wirral Care Record which is used for a combination of direct care management – e.g. placing patients into cohorts and registries to be contacted for care and population health management analysis (secondary uses). The information in the Wirral Care Record persists in the HealtheIntent (Cerner) application. Both are provided from the secure environment in the hosted by Cerner as is the data in the Wirral Care Record. The only element of the platform that is hosted currently on Cloud is the user management for the Wirral Care Record the rest is in their data centre. Storage Location: 6th Floor, The Point, 37 North Wharf Road, London W2 1AF.

#### e-Xchange (Phillips)

The documents are persisted on the publishing organisations local e-Xchange server. Meta data is persisted on the core servers hosted within the iMerseyside AIMES data centre. Organisation Address. Innovation Park, Fairfield, Liverpool L7 9NJ. E-Xchange also has an Audit functionality which is provided by Maywoods, Processing address: 154 Church St, Blackpool, FY1 3PS.





**Describe the scope of the processing:** what is the nature of the data, and does it include special category or criminal offence data? How much data will you be collecting and using? How often? How long will you keep it? How many individuals are affected? What geographical area does it cover?

## Please see Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement

### Data Details:

- Purpose of Data Sharing
- Data to be Shared
- Details of how the Data will be shared Data Flow

#### For Personal and Sensitive Data

Cheshire and Merseyside Shared care Record(s) share data that is personal sensitive in nature. That being that it is person identifiable health and care data. Please see Appendix A for data that is shared.

#### No. of records/individuals affected

2.6 million registered and resident persons across Cheshire and Merseyside alongside those from other areas that may use services within Cheshire and Merseyside.

**Describe the context of the processing:** what is the nature of your relationship with the individuals? How much control will they have? Would they expect you to use their data in this way? Do they include children or other vulnerable groups? Are there prior concerns over this type of processing or security flaws? Is it novel in any way? What is the current state of technology in this area? Are there any current issues of public concern that you should factor in? Are you signed up to any approved code of conduct or certification scheme (once any have been approved)?

Sharing data within a shared care record for the purposes of direct care is a generally accepted process.

There is public concern however for how the data is processed and the purposes for which it is used. All participating organisations within the Cheshire and Merseyside Shared Care Records Programme are expected to have a robust policy in place with regard to offering or permitting a person the right to opt-out from the sharing of their care records.

Cheshire and Merseyside Shared Care record organisations (data controllers to this data sharing arrangement) that inform a person about their rights to opt-out, are expected to also provide the public with relevant transparency and privacy notices to ensure the public is adequately informed of how health and care organisations use their data, particularly data concerning children and vulnerable groups.

Care Centric Lists its privacy notice on its website here Graphnet Health Ltd - Privacy





e-Xchange lists its privacy and transparency notice on the Share2Care website: <a href="http://www.share2care.nhs.uk">www.share2care.nhs.uk</a>.)

Wirral Health Information Exchange has its privacy notice here Digital Wirral - Wirral CCG

## **Opt-outs**

The **National Data Opt**-out does not apply for direct care. However, in the Data Sharing Agreement **Type 1 Opt-outs** (those who do not want their information shared outside of General Practice for purposes other than direct care) will be upheld. This means that data for people who have objected to sharing their data will not flow from the GP record into the Graphnet solution, and others.

It is important that organisations make sure this is visible in privacy notices, as there is a potential ethical issue in that Type 1 Opt-outs are to stop GP data from being used for secondary purposes, and patients may inadvertently be disadvantaged by making a Type 1 Opt-out believing it will just restrict data sharing for secondary purposes, and not realising it could have potential effect on their direct care.

### Local Records

Data for people who have not consented to sharing for their local shared care record does not flow into the solutions. The Codes used to identify these records are:-

- 93C1 Refused consent for upload to local shared electronic record
- XaKRw Refused consent for upload to local shared electronic record
- 416409005 Refused consent for upload to local shared electronic record (finding)

This is true of care centric.

### Current State of Technology

All Data Processors and Data Controllers meet the standards laid out in **Data Sharing Agreement Tiered Framework Tier Zero Memorandum of Understanding and Tier One Data Sharing Agreement – Standards** 

**Describe the purposes of the processing:** what do you want to achieve? What is the intended effect on individuals? What are the benefits of the processing – for you, and more broadly?





The core purpose of the data processing is to provide data for direct care as part of a shared care record. The benefits of this data sharing are widely understood. Some national information on benefits of a shared care record and how people have been consulted nationally can be found here <a href="https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/information-governance-framework-shared-care-records/">https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/information-governance-framework-shared-care-records/</a>

Local Information for Cheshire and Merseyside on the benefits can be found here <a href="https://www.cheshireandmerseysidepartnership.co.uk/digital-bulletin-share2care/">https://www.cheshireandmerseysidepartnership.co.uk/digital-bulletin-share2care/</a>

Within this DPIA, this workstream ensures that data processed is-

- **Necessary:** The reason for sharing an individual's information will be what is required to support that particular contact with care professionals
- **Proportionate:** The amount of information shared will be no more than what is needed to cater for an individual's health and social care needs and,
- **Relevant:** The information shared will be deemed of an appropriate level when assessed against why it is being shared

## Please see Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement

### Data Details:

- Purpose of Data Sharing
- Details of how the Data will be shared Data Flow

### **Step 3: Consultation process**

**Consider how to consult with relevant stakeholders:** describe when and how you will seek individuals' views – or justify why it's not appropriate to do so. Who else do you need to involve within your organisation? Do you need to ask your processors to assist? Do you plan to consult information security experts, or any other experts?

### Workstream Governance:

The workstream has a robust governance structure to cover its programme of work. Various information governance and strategic groups are in place, and seek input and guidance at every level to ensure on-boarded organisations are able to co-design and offer assurance around the workstream. These groups include representation from across all health and care providers and commissioners.

The group that provides the gatekeeper role for information governance is the Information Governance Strategy Committee. This group draws its membership from information governance expertise across health and care providers, and includes; Digital Programme Director; Digital Programme Office rep (IGSC support); Lead for Share2Care (S2C); Lead Combined Intelligence for Population Health Action (CIPHA); Lead for Empower Person Held Record (PHR); C&M ICS IG/DPO Programme Lead; Lead for Information Sharing Gateway





and Data Sharing Agreement Register; SIRO rep; Caldicott Guardian rep; IG Manager/DPO reps: acute, community, mental health and specialist; GP Practices DPO/IG rep; Local care records rep; LA Social Care DPO/IG rep; NHS Digital rep; Data Service Commissioners Regional Office rep

## Cyber Security

The Data Controllers and Data Processors named in this agreement have all signed the Tier Zero and Tier One Data Sharing Standards. Laid out in these are minimum security standards that each individual organisation needs to meet. It is the responsibility of individual data controllers to ensure that meet these standards. The HCP footprint has individual cyber assurance leads, and each organisation has a cyber assurance lead and completes the Data Security and Protection Toolkit at regular intervals.

It is the responsibility of the host organisation of each of the shared care record solutions to assure themselves that the data processors also meet these standards. Care Centric and e-Xchange have Data Processing Agreements that lay out the standards under which data is processed, these are inclusive of Cyber Security.

Cheshire and Merseyside Shared Care Record has a dedicated Cyber Security Group, the role of which is to advise on cyber security across shared care record solutions. They take a key role in the design, delivery, and evolution of the regional cyber security strategy across the workstream footprint.

### **Processors Responsibilities to the Public**

In the event that personal information which has been shared under the DPIA is compromised or possibly compromised, the agency making the discovery will without delay:

- Inform the organisation providing the details
- Take steps to investigate the cause
- Report and investigate as an incident
- If appropriate, take disciplinary action against the person(s) responsible
- Take appropriate steps to avoid a repetition.

On being notified that an individual's personal information has or may have been compromised, the original provider will assess the potential implications for the individual whose information has been compromised will:

- Notify the individual concerned
- Advise the individual of their rights
- Provide the individual with appropriate support.
- Undertake a generalised risk assessment and consider notifying the Information Commissioner's Office in line with expected procedure





#### **Data Processors**

Where data processors are to be used, a legally binding contract (Data Processing Agreement) must be in place which includes the necessary contractual elements required under the UK GDPR. An assessment of the data processor's ability to comply with its terms should also be conducted (due diligence).

#### Data Controller Instruction

Processor is to act only on instruction of the Data Controller.

#### Incident Management

All three providers have a robust incident management procedure in place to respond to any security incidents: the IG/IS and ISO management team will assess issues and monitor progress on the action taken to ensure corrective action is taken.

#### **Record Retention**

Graphnet (System C) - All data is likely to be retained in full until the contract ends, at which point it will be appropriately and securely returned to the Data Controller and removed from Graphnet systems. Graphnet acts upon the instruction of the Data Controller and if it is requested for Graphnet to remove or deleted any information then it would consider as per relevant and lawful instruction. Storage limitation should not be cause for any concerns.

e-Xchange (Phillips) - Data does not persist, so retention policies are in line with source systems.

Wirral Health Information Exchange - Data does not persist so retention policies are in line with source systems.

### FOI and EIR Requests

FOI and EIR requests should be undertaken with the Partner Organisation that holds the data.

#### Training

Training is a requirement for all relevant staff of the processor and controllers handling the data.

#### Staff Contracts

All staff are held under a confidentiality agreement in staff contracts.

All staff accessing the three platforms have a duty of confidentiality. All partner organisations would have signed up to the Data Sharing Agreement, to ensure they fulfill their obligations under the General Data Protection Regulation and Data Protection Act 2018 and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality.





Additionally, all staff involved in direct care would be subject to the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Caldicott Principles.

#### Step 4: Assess necessity and proportionality

**Describe compliance and proportionality measures, in particular:** *what is your lawful basis for processing? Does the processing actually achieve your purpose? Is there another way to achieve the same outcome? How will you prevent function creep? How will you ensure data quality and data minimisation? What information will you give individuals? How will you help to support their rights? What measures do you take to ensure processors comply? How do you safeguard any international transfers?* 

### Please see Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement

#### Data Details:

- Data to be Shared
- Lawful Basis for Sharing Data
- Details of how the Data will be shared Data Flow

#### **Data Protection Review**

A review of the Conditions relating to the processing of personal data under the UK GDPR should be undertaken to ensure projects take account of these and employ a 'privacy by design' approach.

Principle		Compliance
Lawfulness, fairness and transparency	Lawful Basis	<ul> <li>UK General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR):</li> <li>6(1)(e) Necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller</li> <li>9(2)(h) Necessary for the reasons of preventative or occupational medicine, for assessing the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment or management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of Union or Member State law or a contract with a health professional</li> <li>The Health and Social Care (Safety and Quality) Act 2015 inserted a legal Duty to Share Information in Part 9 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (health and adult social care services: information)</li> </ul>





	Official authority:	
	GP Practices	NHS England's powers to commission health services under the NHS Act 2006. Also, Article 6 (1) c for GPs when subject to statutory regulation
	NHS Trusts	National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990
	NHS Foundation Trusts	Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003
	Local Authorities	Local Government Act 1974 Localism Act 2011 Children Act 1989 Children Act 2004 Care Act 2014
Fairness	<ul> <li>their data, where applicable organisation of their data:</li> <li>Right of access</li> <li>Right to rectification</li> <li>Right to restrict procession</li> <li>Right to restrict procession</li> <li>Right to object</li> <li>Rights related to an end of the data portal of the disclosure of any confident purpose other than the dire whom it relates, unless:</li> <li>The patient explicitly consists of the disclosure is permitted sets aside the duty of confident data being processed aggregate data. Under this Common Law Duty of Cordata is pseudonymised, an For direct patient care the Confidentiality is addressed</li> </ul>	n ocessing bility utomated decision making ocluding profiling Common Law Duty of at there should be no use or tial patient information for any ect clinical care of the patient to sents to the use or disclosure; d by law; ed under a statutory process that fidentiality. f Confidentiality is set aside where is suitably pseudonymised or is s Data Sharing Agreement the offidentiality does not apply, as the nd presented as aggregate data.





		Health and Social Care (Safety and Quality) Act 2015)] and implied consent under CLDC will together provide the lawful basis to share in most cases of direct care. In these cases, and any cases of direct care based on explicit consent, the national data opt-out will not apply." https://digital.nhs.uk/services/national-data-opt- out/operational-policy-guidance-document/appendix-2- definitions The right to object under S21 of the General Data Protection Regulation 2016, as enacted, is also relevant. Patients and service users have a right to object to their medical information being used in order to provide safe and effective care, and have the right to register this objection in writing, or verbally, to the clinician concerned.
	Transparency	The responsibility for transparency lies firmly with the controllers who are the partner organisations within the direct care workstream.
Purpose limita	tion	Direct Care
Research		The data cannot be used for research.
Data minimisation		Sensitive data excluded from retrieval follows the recommendations made by The Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) ethics committee and the Joint GP IT Committee: Gender reassignment. Assisted conception and in vitro fertilisation (IVF) Sexually transmitted diseases (STD) Termination of pregnancy For data from local authorities some special category/sensitive data is included, and the inclusion is covered by the legal basis for sharing. All free text data fields are omitted from data collection.
Accuracy		Incident management process related to incorrect documentation is in place with the contracted IT support organisations.
Storage limitation		The data will be stored in line with the NHS Records Management Code of Practice 2021.
Integrity and confidentiality		Access levels to information will be based upon the role held by the provider of health and care. Information will be shared which is necessary, relevant and proportionate to the role the individual fulfils.
		Role Based Access Control (RBAC) will be in place.





## Step 5: Identify and assess risks

## The risk score uses the following matrix

	Catastrophic	5	5	10	Repo	20 ortable to	the ICO	
	Serious	4	4 No Impact	No	8 An impact		0HSC Not 16	
Impact	Adverse	3	has occurred 3	is unlikely 6	9 Benc	12 ortable to		
	Minor	2	2	4		8	10	
	No Impact	1	1	2 No	Impact	has4ccu	rred <sup>5</sup>	
			1	2	3	4	5	
				Not Likely	Likely	Highly Likely	Occurred	
			Likelihood	harm has	occurred	1		

No.	Effect	Description
1	No adverse effect	There is absolute certainty that no adverse effect can arise from the breach
2	Potentially some minor adverse effect or any incident involving vulnerable groups even if no adverse effect occurred	A minor adverse effect must be selected where there is no absolute certainty. A minor adverse effect may be the cancellation of a procedure but does not involve any additional suffering. It may also include possible inconvenience to those who need the data to do their job.
3	Potentially some adverse effect	An adverse effect may be release of confidential information into the public domain leading to embarrassment or it prevents someone from doing their job such as a cancelled procedure that has the potential of prolonging suffering but does not lead to a decline in health.
4	Potentially Pain and suffering/ financial loss	There has been reported suffering and decline in health arising from the breach or there has been some financial detriment occurred. Loss of bank details leading to loss of funds. There is a loss of employment.
5	Death/ catastrophic event.	A person dies or suffers a catastrophic occurrence





Risk Number	Describe source of risk and nature of potential impact on individuals.	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk
1.	That data is not adequate to link records appropriately or sufficiently well coded for accuracy the consequence being that the appropriate people aren't matched for the purposes of direct care	Not likely	Serious	8
2.	Failure to keep clients informed over how their data will be used could lead to a breach of GDPR Article 13 and 14 of the GDPR. Privacy Notices associated with the data sharing which could include elements and processes which do not comply with the provisions under the Data Protection Act.	Likely	Serious	12
3.	<ul> <li>Failure to have processes in place to facilitate the following data protection rights requests could result in a breach Article 15, Article 16, Article 18, and Article 21</li> <li>Right of Access</li> <li>Right to Rectification</li> <li>Right to Restrict Processing</li> <li>Right to Object</li> </ul>	Likely	Serious	12
4.	Failure to ensure that the supplier is compliant with <u>Government and National</u> <u>Cyber Security Standards</u> for cloud based computing could lead to a breach of our security obligations under Article 32 of the GDPR Also, the NHS Transformation Directorate Digital Technology Criteria Assessment (DTAC) <u>https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/key-tools- and-info/digital-technology-assessment- criteria-dtac/ that is designed to be used by healthcare organisations to assess suppliers at the point of procurement or as part of a due diligence process</u>	Likely	Serious	12
5.	Failure to define the process in which direct care providers outside of an LA area can access the records of patients outside of their area could result in data being accessed	Likely	Catastrophic	15





				-
Risk Number	Describe source of risk and nature of potential impact on individuals.	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk Score
	inappropriately leading to a Data Protection Act Section 170 offence			
6.	Failure to have security processes in place to stop partners, with access to patient identifiable data, from accessing the portal from their own personal devices, this could result in a breach of each partner's security obligations under Article 32 of the GDPR	Likely	Catastrophic	15
7.	Failure to have a process in place to audit access to patient identifiable data processes could result in a breach of our security obligations under Article 32.	Likely	Serious	12
8.	Failure to ensure adequate controls are in place to ensure that de-identified data can't be re-identified could result in disclosure of personal information leading to a data breach and could lead to a breach of our security obligations in relation to anonymisation / pseudonymisation processes under Article 32.	Not likely	Catastrophic	10
9.	Failure to have a process in place to verify, audit and test the merging of data from multiple data sources to ensure that data is matched correctly to ensure that a data breach does not occur.	Not likely	Catastrophic	10
10.	Failure to provide / develop a process / technical solution to facilitate clients opting out of their data being shared could lead to a breach of the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality, Data Protection Act and Human Rights Act.	Likely	Catastrophic	15
11.	Failure to ensure that a process is in place to remove a client's data when the partner has closed the record on their systems could result in data being retained inappropriately.	Likely	Catastrophic	15
12.	Failure to ensure that the appropriate international transfer safeguards are in place should the note data be stored on servers outside of the UK could result in a breach of Article 44-56.	Not likely	Catastrophic	10





Risk Number	Describe source of risk and nature of potential impact on individuals.	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk Score
13.	Failure to define the retention of closed records data on the system could result in data being held on the portal inappropriately.	Likely	Catastrophic	15

It is further noted that there is a cyber security risk of a system loss as a result of a cyberattack, to any of the organisations proving data for Unified Direct Care. If for example a "ransomware" attack was successful and that resulted in data becoming inaccessible through encryption, then that could potentially lead to widespread disruption to the delivery of patient facing services whilst system recovery activities were being undertaken. Consequently, the data feeds in to the Unified Direct Care platforms would be delayed.

Robust cyber security processes at provider organisations could mitigate this, but this risk is unlikely to go away completely.





# Step 6: Identify measures to reduce risk

Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
1.	That data is not adequate to link records appropriately or sufficiently well coded for accuracy the consequence being that the appropriate people aren't matched for the purposes of direct care	To use operational flows where possible which reflect actual activity and both in the testing and regular feedback that data quality is given due attention and resource to resolve issues that arise. Routine data quality reports will be available e.g. "orphan" activity records by provider that will be applied to business-as-usual governance e-Xchange will only link patients via the verified NHS number (Organisations should only send NHS number when not verified). If a patient has been registered locally without an NHS number (e.g. hospital number only) the data held will only be visible from the originating site.	Low	Reduced	Yes
2.	Failure to keep clients informed over how their data will be used could lead to a breach of GDPR Article 13 and 14 of the GDPR. Privacy Notices associated with the Data Sharing Agreement, which could include elements and processes which	Each Provider Privacy Notice will meet the terms of the Tier Two Data Sharing Agreement, governed by the GDPR and DPA. It is at the discretion of each partner organisation in the Data Sharing Agreement to add to their Privacy Notice accordingly.	Low	Reduced	Yes





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
	do not comply with the provisions under the Data Protection Act.				
3.	Failure to have processes in place to facilitate the following data protection rights requests could result in a breach Article 15, Article 16, Article 18, and Article 21 • Right of Access • Right to Rectification • Right to Restrict Processing Right to Object	Each Data Controller is accountable under GDPR and will have their own measures in place to meet the eight Rights of Data Subjects. If a Data Subject of any partner organisation wishes to exercise or challenge one of their Rights, they would do that with their provider organisation(s) through the partner organisation's internal processes. Each Data Controller will remain responsible and accountable under GDPR for their clients. The host Trust of the platform – St Helens and Knowsley Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust – have in place their data processing and cyber policies and procedures to maintain the rights of the data subjects. Wirral has the same in place with the Wirral Health Information Exchange and HealtheIntent platforms supplied by Cerner.	Low	Reduced	Yes





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
4.	Failure to ensure that the supplier is compliant with <u>Government and</u> <u>National Cyber</u> <u>Security</u> <u>Standards</u> for cloud based computing could lead to a breach of our security obligations under Article 32 of the GDPR	Data with the St Helens and Knowsley Care Centric element will be stored on 'Azure cloud', which is compliant with Information Governance standards and is safe and secure. Azure is assessed to ISO 27001, ISO 27017, ISO 27018, and many other internationally recognized standards. The scope and proof of certification and assessment reports are published on the Azure Trust Centre section for ISO certification here: https://www.microsoft.com/en- us/trustcenter/compliance/iso- iec27001. The ISO 27001 assessment was performed by the BSI. SystemC and Graphnet Health Ltd comply with the 13 infrastructures as a service (IaaS) principles and are accredited as such e.g. Cyber essentials. Details are available on request contained within the "CareCentric population health cloud assurance" document. Wirral's solutions (HIE and WCR) are hosted in a data centre managed by Cerner and details of their certification and accreditations can be supplied (all contained in the	Low	Reduced	Yes





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
		Wirral level DSA/DPIAs for these solutions). e-Xchange is hosted in the AIMES data centre managed by iMerseyside with local documents hosted in the publishing organisations. Details of their certification and accreditations can be supplied from the originating organisation as they remain the data controller at all times.			
5.	Failure to define the process in which direct care providers outside of an LA area can access the records of patients outside of their area could result in data being accessed inappropriately leading to a Data Protection Act Section 170 offence	<ul> <li>The following processes are in place</li> <li>The supplier defines rigorous role-based access (RBAC) protocols to ensure access to data is limited to those authorised and maintains a register of RBAC</li> <li>The supplier maintains an audit trail of access to data sources</li> <li>The workstream controls access to data assets through a 'Data Asset and Access Group' to ensure only legitimate access is granted to individual projects (use-cases). This is linked to the RBAC process.</li> <li>The Wirral solution works on the same basis as above – e.g. RBAC and governance through its own IG Group.</li> <li>The e-Xchange solution works on the same basis as above – e.g. RBAC</li> </ul>	Low	Reduced	Yes





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
6.	Failure to have security	and governance through the regional IG group. Thorough design and testing occurs when onboarding third party shared records. The following mitigating processes are in place	Low	Reduced	Yes
	processes in place to stop partners, with access to patient identifiable data, from accessing the portal from their own personal devices, this could result in a breach of each partner's security obligations under Article 32 of the GDPR	<ul> <li>Through the RBAC processes and prior to approval to access any data those regional intelligence teams that can legitimately re-identify data using pseudo at source will be obliged to evidence their own procedures to ensure that personal identifiable information will not be accessible through personal devices</li> <li>Access to the data storage service is based on best practice of whitelisting specific IP address ranges, this will reduce the risk of access via personal devices</li> <li>When the service is accessed, all actions are recorded within the audit trail</li> <li>Access to local networks, be this direct or via virtual private network (VPN) will be subject to the acceptable usage policy of the organisation that the person making access works for. Each individual will be subject to the</li> </ul>			





Risk Number	Risk Summary	risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
		policies and procedures outlined by their employer			
7.	Failure to have a process in place to audit access to patient identifiable data processes could result in a breach of our security obligations under Article 32.	<ul> <li>The following mitigations are in place;</li> <li>The Azure SQL environment logs all SQL queries which take place against the data marts to provide an audit trial of what identifiable data has been accessed and by whom</li> <li>Access to the data will be subject to approval from the data controllers. The existing change control process would approve access and grant permissions</li> <li>All activity reports are available as outlined above and would be provided to assist audit. Audit process and timeframes will be specific to each organisation</li> <li>Wirral uses an audit solution called Sentinel which allows audit of the use of the combination of HIE/WCR access. Discussions have begun to discuss how the audit logs for Wirral HIE/WCR might be combined with e-Xchange (and CareCentric)</li> <li>e-Xchange uses an audit solution produced by Maywoods. This audits activity either by users or person regarding access</li> </ul>	Low	Reduced	Yes





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
		to documents and data across exchange and connected shared records			
8.	Failure to ensure adequate controls are in place to ensure that de- identified data can't be re- identified could result in disclosure of personal information leading to a data breach and could lead to a breach of our security obligations in relation to anonymisation / pseudonymisation processes under Article 32	Direct Care data marts hold the full Patient Identifiable Data along with field level configuration for both anonymisation and sensitive clinical coding reference data. Stored procedures query tables using filed level configuration to anonymise data at the point of extract. SSIS package cross references data with sensitive clinical coding to further remove restricted data. Fully anonymised data is written to the research data mart in the same format as the direct care source. Key masking uses a customer specific SALT value + SHA2_256 hashing. Anonymised mart Source is the Direct Care mart holding all data Data is copied to the Anonymised mart Sensitive Clinical Codes stripped out in flight Field level configuration for anonymisation No change Blank Truncate Mask Dates	Low	Reduced	Yes





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Effect on Risk: Eliminated, Reduced, Accepted	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
		<ul> <li>Key fields undergo one way encryption, maintaining referential integrity</li> <li>Pseudonymisation         <ul> <li>Source is the Direct Care mart holding all data</li> <li>Data is copied to the Pseudonymised mart</li> <li>Opted Out patients and Sensitive Clinical Codes stripped out in flight</li> <li>Field level configuration for Pseudonymisation                 <ul> <li>No change</li> <li>Blank</li> <li>Truncate</li> <li>Mask Dates</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>Tokenised IDs Can be re identified         <ul> <li>National DE ID / RE ID or encrypted local values</li> <li>Secured data table which stores mapping</li> <li>User interface to reidentify</li> <li>Key fields undergo two- way encryption, maintaining referential integrity</li> <li>Key fields undergo two- way encryption,</li> <li>Maintaining referential integrity</li> <li>Key fields undergo two-</li> <li>Secure tial integrity</li> <li>Key fields undergo two-</li> <li>Secure tial integrity</li> </ul> </li> </ul>			
		In Wirral the two solutions behave differently. The HIS is a real-time solution and does not store data. The Wirral Care Record does store data from their stakeholders. This data is held securely by			





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
		Cerner and can be provided in anonymised and pseudonymised versions. There is a process to align access to purpose and governed through an RBAC system.			
9.	Failure to have a process in place to verify, audit and test the merging of data from multiple data sources to ensure that data is matched correctly to ensure that a data breach does not occur	Graphnet merges data into its longitudinal patient record based on the patient NHS Number, name, and date of birth. Where the NHS number is a verified number, we would match on this. If this is not the case, we use the three items described above. Reports are available that outline the match success and Graphnet have performed audits for clients to ensure data integrity. The tools available to client are designed to support the ongoing data quality process which is the responsibility of each data controller. Wirral uses the same parameters and there is a queue for records about which there might be any uncertainty which is managed by Data Quality staff. e-Xchange queries all sources of data at time of request, internally data	Low	Reduced	Yes





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
10.	Failure to provide	returned is by Verified NHS Number only and for connect shared record by NHS no and DOB.		Eliminated	Yes
	Failure to provide / develop a process / technical solution to facilitate clients opting out of their data being shared could lead to a breach of the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality, Data Protection Act and Human Rights Act	Type 1 opts out (those who do not want their information shared outside of General Practice for purposes other than direct care) will be upheld. This means that data for people who have objected to sharing their data will not flow from the GP record into the Graphnet solution (both Wirral systems and Graphnet). General Practice Data Opt Outs (people who do not want their general practice data to leave their GP Practice), their data will not flow National Opt outs are also removed from the care centric solution for uses of the data other than direct care This removal includes all data sources. The ability to opt out for direct patient care would only be instigated subject to a successful application by the data subject under Article 21 of GDPR. e-Xchange opt out remains under the control of the data controller at organisation level. The public is directed to	Low		res





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
		contact all organisations directly. e-Xchange has no functionality for the public to access the solution to opt out directly.			
11.	Failure to ensure that a process is in place to remove a client's data when the partner has closed the record on their systems could result in data being retained inappropriately	The NHS Records Management Code of Practice 2021 sets out what people working with or in NHS organisations in England need to do to manage records correctly. It's based on current legal requirements and professional best practice. All organisations that contribute to the solution will be governed by the above. Each organisation will have its own records management policy and define both the duration of retentions and removal policy. The data processor will hold data in line with the contract terms. All data will be returned and purged at contract end, or as set out in the contractual terms.	Low	Reduced	Yes
12.	Failure to ensure that the appropriate international transfer safeguards are in	The supplier, Graphnet Health, are a UK based company. All data is stored in the UK and there is no server storage outside of the UK.	Low	Eliminated	Yes





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
	place should the note data be stored on servers outside of the UK could result in a breach of Article 44-56	All information can be found in the CareCentric population health cloud assurance document. Cerner hold Wirral patient data in their UK data centre. All e-Xchange data is held within local C&M NHS data storage.			
13.	Failure to define the retention of closed records data on the system could result in data being held on the portal inappropriately	The NHS Records Management Code of Practice 2021 sets out what people working with or in NHS organisations in England need to do to manage records correctly. It's based on current legal requirements and professional best practice. Each organisation that contributes to the solution will have a record retention policy. The elements of the record, when combined, creates a holistic view of a care recipient's journey. As a result this new record would be retained for the duration of the longest term for which the record is retained within the social care community. If the contract is continued, then the retention period for the combined record will be subject to an agreement from the social care providers.	Low	Reduced	Yes





Risk Number	Risk Summary	Options to reduce or eliminate risk	Residual Risk: Low Medium, High	Risk: Eliminated,	Measure Accepted: Yes/No
		For e-Xchange each organisation that contributes to the solution will have a record retention policy as they remain as the data controller and processor. Once the retention policy is manually applied the records will be automatically redacted.			





# Step 7: Sign off and record outcomes

## Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) - Workstream: Unified Direct Care

Item	Name/date	Notes				
Measures approved by:	09/06/22	Approved at IGSC				
Residual risks approved by:	21/06/22	Approved				
DPO advice provided:	21/06/22	Approved at IGSC				
Comments: This work for Unified Direct Care meets the requirements for UK GDPR, and so the data processing can proceed.						
DPO advice accepted or overruled by:	09/06/22	If overruled, you must explain your reasons				
Comments: Approved by ICS IGSC Deputy Chair and members						
Consultation responses reviewed by:	ICS IGSC members 09/06/22	If your decision departs from individuals' views, you must explain your reasons				
Comments: Approved.						
This DPIA will kept under review by:	IGSC members	The DPO should also review ongoing compliance with DPIA				





Appendix A: Data Sets

## Care Centric (Graphnet) data set

For full details of the following Care Centric (Graphnet) data set, please see the **Tier Two: Unified Direct Care Data Sharing Agreement:** 

- 1. Social Care Child
- 2. Social Care Adult
- 3. Acute
- 4. Community (Individual Spec document for each item)
- 5. Mental Health (Individual Spec document for each item)
- 6. General Practice EMIS
- 7. General Practice TPP
- 8. Cancer Data Set



## Cerner data set

HIE allows partners access to the following from their combined systems.

Current Problems, Current Medication, Allergies and Recent tests:

- Problem view
- Diagnosis View
- Medication including Current, Past and Issues relevant
- Risks and Warnings
- Procedures
- Investigations
- Examination (Blood Pressure Only)
- Events consisting of Encounters, Admissions and Referrals
- Patient Demographics

### e-Xchange data set

N.B. no free text information will be included.

Name Address (home or business) and Postcode NHS Number Date of Birth





Online identifier (e.g. Email Address, IP Address) Identification Number (e.g. Hospital number) Location Data Employment School Adoption Safeguarding Racial/Ethnic Origin Religious or Philosophical Beliefs Genetic Data Biometric Data (e.g. Fingerprints) Sexual Life Sexual Orientation

#### Health Data

Clinical diagnosis and history Treatment plans Medications Discharge summaries Clinic letters Radiology data Laboratory data, and any other pertinent health data for direct care

#### Social Care Data

Case history Person details Carers Disability Risk type, and any other pertinent social care data for direct care

## Vaccine Tracing Intervention data set

- 1. Allocation
- 2. Date of Contact
- 3. NHS Number
- 4. Title
- 5. Given Name
- 6. Family Name
- 7. Date of Birth
- 8. Sex
- 9. Ethnicity
- 10. Dominant Cohort



Health & Care	Partnership
for Cheshire &	Merseyside



- 11. Address
- 12. Address 2
- 13. Address 3
- 14. Address 4
- 15. Postcode
- 16. GP Practice Code
- 17. GP Practice name
- 18. PCN Name
- 19. Mobile telephone
- 20. Home telephone
- 21. Declined first dose
- 22. Category
- 23. Preferred language
- 24. Unable To Proceed (declined call)
- 25. Reason why call was declined
- 26. Appointment Accepted